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Abstract—In forensics, evidence such as DNA, fingerprints,
bullets and cartridge cases, shoeprints or digital evidence is
often compared, to infer if they come from the same or dif-
ferent sources. This helps to generate leads through database
searches, where information from different investigations can
be combined, if pieces of evidence are judged to have come
from the same source. For specific pairs of comparisons, such
as whether a particular cartridge case comes from a suspect’s
gun, an inference of a match can also be used as testimony in
courts. We demonstrate how such matching problems fit into
the record linkage framework commonly used in statistics and
computer science, illustrating this using examples from DNA and
firearms identification. We propose some ways that record linkage
can inform forensic matching. Finally, we develop methodology
to match accounts on anonymous marketplaces. In forensic
matching, the stakes are high and the consequences of false
arrests or wrongful convictions are severe. The field would benefit
from a more principled way of developing matching methods.
Index Terms—record linkage, forensic matching, unstructured
data
I. INTRODUCTION
Record linkage or data matching is the process of inferring
which entries in different databases correspond to the same
real-world identity, in the absence of a unique identifier [1].
When dealing with duplicate entries in a single database,
it is more commonly known as deduplication or duplicate
detection. Depending on the field, it is known by different
names, in particular in statistics, “record linkage” is used, with
applications such as linking Census records, death records,
bibliographic databases, and so forth.
Forensic evidence refers to DNA, fingerprints, bullets and
cartridge cases, shoeprints, digital and other evidence left
behind when a crime is committed. The underlying assumption
is that the perpetrator of the crime, or tools they might have
used, leave identifiable characteristics, such that the evidence
can be traced back to the source. This is the basis of forensic
matching, where pairs of samples are compared, to infer if they
came from the same source. The comparison can be thought
of from two perspectives: a database search used to generate
investigative leads in a one-to-many comparison, versus an
This research was partially funded by the Center for Statistics and Ap-
plications in Forensic Evidence (CSAFE) through Cooperative Agreement
#70NANB15H176 between NIST and Iowa State University, which includes
activities carried out at Carnegie Mellon University, University of California
Irvine, and University of Virginia.
evaluation or “identification” in a one-to-one comparison, for
example when evidence is compared with a sample taken from
a suspect.1 These are closely related however, since a one-to-
many comparison could be treated as repeating a one-to-one
comparison many times. In current practice for fingerprints and
firearms, an automated database search might be conducted,
followed by manual examination by a human examiner. Any
final determination of a match that is used as court testimony
is made by an examiner. This has led to recent public scrutiny
due to the subjective nature and lack of scientific validity [2].
There has been a push towards automated methods, and these
have been developed by various groups for database searches,
objective identification, or both (e.g. [3], [4]). The focus of
this paper is on automated forensic matching methods.
At first glance, record linkage and forensic matching might
seem like separate problems, but we demonstrate a corre-
spondence between the two – approaches traditionally used
in forensic matching fit into the framework of statistical
record linkage problems. This correspondence has been noted
by statisticians in the past, but to our knowledge this has
not been formalized or exploited. [5] mention comparing an
unidentified fingerprint with fingerprints of known individuals
as a possible application of computer matching. [6] establishes
a correspondence between statistical disclosure control and
forensic statistics based on their common use of the concept
of “probability of identification,” focusing on how disclosure
control can learn from the literature on forensic identification.
By thinking about forensics problems in the context of
record linkage, we immediately have well-developed frame-
works and tools at our disposal. We illustrate the correspon-
dence using examples from DNA and firearms identification,
and propose some ways that the literature from record linkage
can inform forensic matching. Finally, we develop methodol-
ogy for comparison of one type of digital evidence.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1) Demonstrating a link between forensic matching prob-
lems and record linkage, and establishing a framework
to approach the former
2) Suggesting ways that record linkage can inform forensic
matching
1In forensics, a distinction between “same-source” and “specific-source” is
also sometimes made, where the former refers to coming from a common,
unknown source.
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3) Proposing a method for matching seller accounts on
anonymous marketplaces and presenting preliminary re-
sults.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
establishes the connection between record linkage and forensic
matching problems, using DNA and firearms identification
as illustrative examples. Section III explores some specific
ways in which forensic matching might benefit from being
thought of as a record linkage problem. Section IV describes
methodology for matching seller accounts on anonymous
marketplaces, and presents preliminary results, and Section V
concludes the discussion.
II. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN RECORD LINKAGE AND
FORENSIC MATCHING
A standard framework for record linkage is in Figure 1.
This framework is adapted from [1] and [7]. We begin with
n records to be linked or deduplicated. Each of these records
have some set of features. Next we generate pairwise compar-
isons from these n records, where each pairwise comparison
consists of one or more similarity measures. Here an indexing
scheme is sometimes used, where comparisons are generated,
for example, only if the pair fulfills some criteria, so that not
all
n(n−1)
2 pairwise comparisons have to be computed. Next
the pairwise comparisons are classified into matches and non-
matches. In the final step clusters of records are produced from
these comparisons, such that transitivity is preserved.
In terms of forensic matching, many different automated
or semi-automated approaches have been developed by peo-
ple working in different fields, in an ad-hoc manner. These
might be for database searches or for one-to-one comparisons.
Using the examples of DNA and firearms identification, we
demonstrate how forensic matching problems fall into this
framework, noting that this extends to automated forensic
matching methods for other evidence types.
One conceptual difference is that in record linkage we
might be more concerned about disambiguating a data set to
get a final deduplicated data set, while in forensic matching
problems we are interested in comparing a new sample against
some database or existing sample. Practically however, for
the latter we often start with some database which is used to
develop matching methods. We can think of this as a record
linkage problem where we disambiguate the database, and then
use the same methods for comparisons of the new sample
with the database. Another feature is that in forensic matching
problems, we are often dealing with much more complex,
unstructured data, such as multivariate data, images and text.
A. DNA
DNA profiling is often described as the gold standard of
forensic matching methods, because there is a scientific basis
for performing comparisons and computing likelihood ratios.
The United States government maintains the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), which is a database containing DNA
profiles from crime scenes as well as known offenders.
Each DNA profile consists of information from 13 (or more)
locations on the DNA. In particular, these are locations with
short tandem repeats (STRs), sections of DNA with repeating
patterns. The number of repeats at each location occurs with
different frequencies for each individual, and the number of
repeats at each of the 13 locations form a DNA profile. By
biological theory, all of the STRs are independent, and the
distribution of the number of repeats at each location differs by
race (White, African American, Hispanic, etc.). If information
at all of the STR locations match exactly, a comparison is
reported as a match. A likelihood ratio can then be estimated
as
LR =
P[Evidence, e.g. 13 STRs match|Same source]
P[Evidence|Different source] . (1)
The numerator is usually taken to be 1, and the de-
nominator is estimated using a generative model, based on
known frequencies of repeats at each location in the relevant
reference population (for example the race of the suspect). The
likelihood ratio can be interpreted as the number of times more
likely we are to observe the evidence if the profiles come from
the same source than if they do not, and hence quantifies the
weight of evidence. This number is often reported in courts.
To be explicit in using the framework in Figure 1, each
DNA sample (record) is summarized using 13 features which
correspond to the 13 STRs. The similarity for each pair of
records is a vector of length 13, with each entry being a binary
value for whether the number of repeats at the STR location is
the same. A threshold-based classification method is then used,
requiring that all 13 entries be 1 in order to be classified as a
match. Mathematically, we can describe the similarity metric




i=1 I(xi = yi),
and an unsupervised threshold-based classification approach
is used, with a cutoff of 1 to be classified as a match. Since
this is an exact matching scheme, transitivity is automatically
preserved.
Estimating the likelihood ratio is then an additional step.
The methodology used is essentially the same as in the Fellegi-
Sunter model, which is often considered the standard model
for record linkage, in the case where population frequencies
of the features are known [8]. In this case, the distribution of
number of repeats at each location is estimated for each race
from standard population databases, and is treated as known.
Using the language from [8], in the numerator of Equation
1 are m-probabilities and in the denominator u-probabilities.
The Fellegi-Sunter model and its connection to likelihood
ratios in forensic matching is discussed in greater detail in
Section III.
B. Firearms identification
A gun is thought to leave identifiable marks on bullets and
cartridge cases, and if these are retrieved from crime scenes,
they can be compared to other samples, to infer if they were
fired from the same gun. The mechanism in which marks are
imparted is illustrated in Figure 2. When a gun is fired, the
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Fig. 1. Standard framework for statistical record linkage problems.
cartridge is hit by the firing pin of the gun, which causes it
to break up into two components, the bullet which goes out
the barrel, and the cartridge case that is subsequently ejected
from the side. Rifling, manufacturing defects, and impurities
in the barrel create striation marks on the bullet. As for the
cartridge case, at least two kinds of marks are created: the
firing pin impression is caused by the firing pin hitting the
cartridge, and breechface marks are impressed by the bottom
surface of the cartridge pressing against the breech block of the
gun. Any microscopic patterns or imperfections on the breech
block may be reproduced in the breechface impression, and
this is thought to individualize each gun (see e.g. [9]).
Fig. 2. On the top we have a gun that is about to be fired, showing the
internal parts, and a cartridge before firing. On the bottom left is the bottom
surface of a cartridge case after firing. The firing pin impression is clearly
visible as the “hole” in the center of the primer surface, while the breechface
marks lie on the remaining primer surface. On the bottom right is an image of
such a bottom surface, taken using a reflectance microscope. (Source: https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rueckstoss-theorie.png?uselang=en, https:
//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:45 Colt - 1.jpg and https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:45er 3.jpg, retrieved 8/5/2018.)
Firearms identification has a long history, but unlike DNA
matching, there is no well-understood scientific basis upon
which marks are created, and hence for comparisons to be
made. In current practice in the United States, evidence is
entered into a national database called the National Integrated
Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN). A computer-based
platform captures an image of the retrieved cartridge case and
runs a proprietary search algorithm, returning a list of top
ranked potential matches from the database. Other automatic
comparison methods have been developed by engineers and
scientists both in industry and in academia. We describe how
these approaches fall under the record linkage framework.
Bullets Automated methods methods generally extract a
profile or signature from the bullet lands (the surface between
two bullet grooves). This profile serves as the features for
each record. For pairs of profiles, various similarity metrics
have been used, such as the correlation between aligned
profiles, maximum number of consecutive matching striae and
average Euclidean vertical distance between surface measure-
ments of aligned profiles. For classification, both unsupervised
threshold-based (e.g. [10]) and supervised methods (e.g. [11])
have been used. For example, [11] used a total of seven
similarity measures, and a random forest classifier, reporting
no classification errors on a test data set.
Cartridge cases Comparison of cartridge cases follows a
similar process. Some groups use the entire image as features
for each record (image) (see e.g. [4], [12]–[14]), while other
groups extract features from these images (e.g. [15] extracts
“corner-like textured regions... which correspond to the same
types of ridges, ... that a trained firearms examiner would
identify.”) For each pair, similarity measures include the cor-
relation between aligned images, average Euclidean distance,
and the number of matched features. For classification, both
unsupervised and supervised methods have been used. A
match or non-match conclusion is not necessarily produced,
instead some methods report a final similarity score, likelihood
ratio or probability of matches. As an example, [13] use a
supervised boosting-based classification method.
III. HOW RECORD LINKAGE CAN INFORM FORENSIC
MATCHING
Using a record linkage framework allows us to take ad-
vantage of tools that have been developed, without having to
reinvent the wheel. In Section IV we demonstrate how associ-
ated techniques can be directly applied to develop methods for
new forensic matching problems. In forensic domains such as
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DNA, fingerprints and firearms identification where there are
existing well-developed bodies of literature, we might think
about improvements that can be made. The following is a list
of some potential ideas.
1) Fellegi-Sunter, cutoffs, and weight of evidence.
[8] proposed a probabilistic framework for assigning
matches, and this subsequently gained widespread pop-
ularity. Briefly, the framework is as follows. Let A and
B be two databases to be linked, and let a ∈ A and
b ∈ B be generic records in A and B. Let M =
{(a, b); a = b, a ∈ A, b ∈ B} be the matched set, and
U = {(a, b); a = b, a ∈ A, b ∈ B} be the unmatched
set. Let γab = (γab(1), ..., γab(k)) be the comparison
vector between a and b, having k components. Then
the Fellegi-Sunter method makes use of cutoffs on the
following likelihood ratio in favor of (a, b) ∈M :
P[γab = g|(a, b) ∈M ]
P[γab = g|(a, b) ∈ U ] , (2)
where g is the observed k-dimensional comparison vec-
tor. If the likelihood ratio exceeds some cutoff, the pair
is classified as a match, and if it is below some other
cutoff, a non-match. These cutoffs are determined by
pre-specified limits on false positive and false negative
rates. The parameters involved in the likelihood ratio are
commonly estimated using the EM algorithm [16].
Adapting such a framework for forensic matching has
two distinct advantages. First we notice that Equation
2 is essentially a specific formulation of Equation 1.
The likelihood ratio has become widely accepted as a
measure for the strength of forensic evidence. Particu-
larly Europe has moved decisively in this direction, and
guidelines for forensic laboratories now recommend the
reporting of likelihood ratios for all forensic disciples
[17]. However there is no consensus on how these like-
lihood ratios should be estimated. For DNA, a generative
model is used to determine the probabilities of observing
particular DNA profiles, as described in Section II. In
other forensic fields similar calculations are difficult
because of the lack of knowledge of a scientific basis in
which say, bullet striations are produced. Instead score-
based likelihood ratios have been suggested, which look
at distributions of similarity scores for known matching
and non-matching pairs (see e.g. [18]). Further investi-
gation could reveal if other methods from the record
linkage literature that are used to estimate likelihood
ratios, could be relevant in a forensic context.
The second advantage has to do with the cutoffs
used which control for error rates (false positives and
false negatives). This would be an improvement over
threshold-based methods that have been suggested in
the forensic literature, which use somewhat arbitrary
cutoffs without a proper quantification of error rates. For
example, in cartridge case comparisons, [19] suggests
using a cutoff of six matching cells (regions on the
cartridge case) to determine matches, with the rationale
being that in casework for bullets, examiners use six
consecutive matching striae as a cutoff.
2) Indexing. Indexing aims to reduce the quadratic com-
plexity of the data matching process through the use of
data structures to efficiently generate candidate record
pairs that likely correspond to matches [1]. Blocking is a
straightforward approach to indexing, where records are
grouped into blocks based on some similarity criteria,
and pairwise comparisons are generated only for records
in the same block. For forensic matching problems,
as the sizes of databases grow, reducing computational
complexity becomes increasingly important, particularly
since these data are often images which are high-
dimensional objects. Indexing techniques in the record
linkage literature could be useful in this regard.
3) Generating clusters of records. In the last step in
Figure 1, clusters of records are generated from pairwise
similarities. For example, if A is similar to B and B is
similar to C, then A, B and C might all be assigned
the same cluster. If the focus of forensic matching is on
producing leads through database searches, generating
clusters within the database could be an easy way to
generate additional leads: using the same example, if the
new sample is similar to A, then we might also consider
B and C to be leads.
4) Deduplicating existing databases. The last two sug-
gestions both hint at the benefits of managing existing
databases. There might be some desire to deduplicate
and/or summarize existing national forensic databases,
such as fingerprint or cartridge cases, and it is unclear if
this is currently being done. The record linkage literature
can definitely lend itself towards this effort.
This of course is not in any way an exhaustive list. Record
linkage is an active research area and there are many potential
ways in which the forensic field might take advantage of recent
advances.
IV. MATCHING ACCOUNTS ON ANONYMOUS
MARKETPLACES
In this section we demonstrate the usefulness of adapting
record linkage methods to a new forensic matching problem:
matching seller accounts on online anonymous marketplaces.
We describe our proposed methodology and share preliminary
results.
Anonymous marketplaces have certain features that provide
anonymity protections to buyers and sellers. They run on
the dark web using browsers like Tor, use cryptocurrencies
for payment, and tools such as PGP for encryption. Such
marketplaces are hence most commonly associated with illegal
activities such as the sale of drugs and stolen personal data.
This is a relatively recent phenomenon, with the first such
marketplace being launched in February 2011 [20]. Due to
the anonymous nature of such marketplaces, tracking down
sellers is difficult and many cases are still being investigated.
Sellers can operate accounts on different marketplaces, and
also multiple accounts on the same marketplace. In earlier
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sections we described how matching forensic evidence such
as cartridge cases aids investigations by enabling evidence
from different crime scenes to be combined; linking seller
accounts does the same. In particular, this could help with
eventually linking accounts to real-world identities. As far as
we know, law enforcement seeks to connect seller accounts on
the various marketplaces, but there does not currently appear
to be an automatic way of doing so, unlike in the other forensic
disciplines. So far agents have relied primarily on “old-school”
investigative methods, for example, using online forums or
manual comparisons of items sold [21], searching for PGP
keys on Grams [22] or using captured login credentials to
seize accounts on other marketplaces [23]. In this part of the
paper, we apply record linkage techniques to match accounts
automatically and on a large scale.
There have been some efforts by researchers to link user
accounts on anonymous marketplaces. Most of these are
deterministic methods (they use exact matching schemes). [20]
used PGP keys, aliases and information from the Grams (a
marketplace search engine) seller directory. [24] used PGP
keys and aliases, as well as manual comparison of profile
information. [25] similarly used exact matching on PGP keys,
aliases and profile descriptions. [26] found an 8% overlap
between aliases between two marketplaces, but made no
further attempt to infer if they belonged to the same entities.
[27] used processed aliases, resulting in a 52% reduction from
the number of accounts to unique entities. The problem with
these exact matching schemes is that they assume that there
are no errors in the variables used for matching. Most recently,
[28] use images taken from item listings, and train a deep
neural network for detecting multiple accounts on the same
and different marketplaces.
A. Data
To our knowledge there is no national database of seller
account information, but marketplaces are publicly available
and information can be gathered by scraping associated web
pages. Here the data that we are using are from [20]’s data
collection effort, which consists of pages scraped from various
marketplaces, including Agora, Evolution, Hydra, Pandora
and Silk Road 2. These were collected from 2013 to 2015,
and include seller pages, item listings as well as feedback.2
Information from seller pages includes account IDs or handles,
PGP keys and profile descriptions. Item listings include item
titles, descriptions, prices, and the shipping country (origin and
destination). Feedback refers to reviews left by buyers, and can
be used as a proxy for the number of sales, since feedback is
often mandatory on such marketplaces. Feedback information
includes the approximate date the feedback was left, the item
it corresponds to, and the buyer’s comment. These pages were
scraped regularly during the collection interval (2013-2015),
so for a particular user, there could be multiple captures of
their profile page and item listings, each with an associated
timestamp.
2Anonymized data are publicly available at https://arima.cylab.cmu.edu/
markets/cybercrime.php.
To develop our model, we chose a subset of seller accounts
having feedback (sales) any time from May-Aug 2014. We
then use their profile page with the closest timestamp to Aug
31, 2014. All item listings with sales between May and August
2014 are used, together with the feedback received during this
period. For each of these items, description pages with the
closest timestamp to Aug 31, 2014 are used.
This results in 3,512 seller accounts, selling 40,995 different
items with 422,044 sales (pieces of feedback) being selected
for our analysis. From these, we extract IDs, profile descrip-
tions, item listing titles and descriptions, and feedback. PGP
keys are extracted from profile and item descriptions.
B. Methodology
Similarity Metrics From the information available for
each record, as described in Section IV-A, we generate the
following similarity metrics for each pairwise comparison.
From profiles:
1) Edit distance between the IDs
2) Same or different marketplace
3) Jaccard similarity between Bag-of-Words representation
of profile descriptions
4) Absolute difference between diversity coefficient3
From item listings:
1) Jaccard similarity between Bag-of-Words representation
of item titles and descriptions
2) Inventory-related [29] Jaccard similarities: consider
unique categories, (Category, dosage) pairs, (Category,
unit) pairs, and (Category, dosage, unit) tuples
3) Absolute difference between number of tokens in the
Bag-of-Words representation of item descriptions
From feedback (sales):
1) Absolute difference between number of days active
(defined as the period from May-Aug 2014 between
which sales are recorded)
2) Absolute difference between number of listings with
feedback (sales)
3) Absolute difference between the number of feedback,
and number of feedback normalized by days active and
marketplace total
Classification An interesting feature of these marketplaces
is the availability of PGP keys. Briefly, to receive a PGP-
encrypted message, a seller would generate a PGP key-pair,
consisting of a public key and a private key. The public key
is listed as part of the seller’s profile or item listings, and
the sender would encrypt his message using this public key.
Only the person in possession of the private key will be able
to decrypt the message. These public keys are unique and
could potentially be used to link seller accounts, but usage of
PGP encryption is not mandatory, and keys do not necessarily
correspond to unique sellers.
In order to use PGP keys to generate labels, we do the
following. We consider PGP public keys that are posted on
3Briefly, this measures the diversity in terms of categories of items sold.
See [20] for more details.
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profiles or item descriptions of each seller account. If a pair
of accounts share at least one PGP key, we label them as a
match, and if not, we label them as a non-match. This relies
on the assumption that two accounts with the same key belong
to the same seller, and accounts with different keys belong to
different sellers. This may not always be true, for example,
the same seller might use multiple PGP keys, one for each
account. On the other hand, a seller might advertise another
seller’s PGP public key in an attempt at impersonation, so a
pair of accounts with the same key might in fact belong to
different sellers. As a result, some pairs would be mislabeled,
but in the absence of ground-truth data for whether pairs
of accounts belong to the same seller, we use these labels
generated by PGP keys to train our model.
Out of the 3,512 accounts to be matched, 2,820 (about
80%) have at least one known PGP key. Of all the pairwise
comparisons, the match statuses generated in the manner
described are: 3,974,069 non-match, 721 match, 2,190,526
unavailable. We train a random forest classifier with 100 trees,
using 10-fold cross-validation on the comparisons with known
PGP-match status, in order to generate predictions for the
PGP-labeled data. We record the number of votes for each
pair. As for the unlabeled data (pairs with at least one missing
PGP key), we train the same model on all the labeled data and
predict on these, similarly recording the number of votes for
each pair.
Generate Clusters of Accounts With the number of votes
in favor of a match label for each pair, we use hierarchical
clustering to generate clusters of accounts that are predicted
to belong to the same seller. Note that for the labeled data,
we use the predicted number of votes generated as described,
instead of using the PGP labels directly, since these could be
erroneous. Now, we take the dissimilarity measure to be 1−x,
where x is the proportion of votes in favor of a match label
in the random forest. We then use two schemes to generate
clusters of accounts that belong to the same seller. The first is
complete linkage with a cutoff of .5, and the second is single
linkage with the same cutoff.
To describe the above in words, we take .5 to be the cutoff
above which we assign a match label to a pair. Then the first
scheme necessitates that each seller account in the same cluster
matches with every other account in cluster, and the second
only requires that each account in the cluster matches with
one other account in the cluster.
C. Results
Preliminary results of the classification step on the labeled
data are in Figure 3. The corresponding confusion matrix is
also included; it is generated by classifying pairs with at least
50% of the votes as matches. The F1-score is .88. The random
forest generates variable importances based on how much
the prediction error increases when out-of-bag data for that
variable is permuted [30], and the most important variables in
this case tend to be textual features. In decreasing order of
importance, these are ID distance, Jaccard similarity between
descriptions, item titles and profiles.
The first method of generating clusters (complete linkage)
results in 2,530 clusters, and the cluster sizes, or number of
accounts per seller, are tabulated in Table I.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS PER SELLER USING COMPLETE LINKAGE.
Accounts per seller (cluster) 1 2 3 4 5
Number of sellers 1824 479 185 35 7
The second method (single linkage) results in 2,487 clusters,
with larger cluster sizes. These are in Table II.
TABLE II
NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS PER SELLER USING SINGLE LINKAGE.
Accounts per seller (cluster) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of sellers 1790 445 193 48 8 1 1 1
An example of the largest cluster of accounts is in Table
III. Although we are unable to verify with absolute certainty
if these accounts indeed belong to the same seller, manual
examination as well as a Reddit post4 corroborate this finding.
In this example we also note that a simpler method, such
as solely using PGP keys or aliases would be inadequate in
identifying all accounts belonging to this seller.
TABLE III
LARGEST CLUSTER OF ACCOUNTS FOUND.
Alias Marketplace PGP
scaptain Pandora
Scaptain Silk Road 2 B
tambourineman Agora A






One tricky aspect of the data is the absence of readily
available ground-truth labels for whether pairs of accounts
belong to the same seller or not. So far we have used PGP
keys to generate training labels, but we note that these could
be erroneous. This has implications on model and parameter
selection. Some experimentation was done in terms of op-
timizing the random forest parameters, such as the number
of trees and the number of variables tried at each split. For
example, increasing the number of variables tried at each split
tended to increase the number of predicted matches, while
decreasing the number of trees led to more errors. Due to the
large size of the data set, increasing the number of trees beyond
100 was somewhat infeasible because of long computation
times and high memory requirements. We also tried other
classifiers such as boosting and logistic regression, with similar
4https://www.reddit.com/r/SilkRoad/comments/2a5g2d/best heroin
vendor that ships to canada/
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Fig. 3. Proportion of cross-validation votes from the random forest on PGP-labeled data. The confusion matrix is also included, where the numbers are counts
corresponding to the number of crosses in the corresponding quadrant. The top-right and bottom-left quadrants are when the model predictions do not agree
with PGP labels.
or slightly worse results. Ultimately, in the absence of ground-
truth labels, it is difficult to properly judge the attempts at
model and parameter selection, so this has not currently been
fully explored.
An important direction of future work will involve methods
to deal with these potentially erroneous labels. We could first
flag record pairs for manual review. These might include
pairs where the model predictions and PGP-labels do not
match, pairs in which the model is unsure, or clusters of
large sizes, and so forth. The advantage is that a human can
use information that may not be captured by the model, for
example from feedback messages, or from other sources such
as online forums. These manually generated labels can then be
used in a number of ways, depending on the number of pairs
labeled. Supervised models can be trained using the manually
labeled pairs, and in this case both models and parameters can
be optimized fully since we know that the labels are accurate.
A semi-supervised approach can also be used: the model can
be retrained with the manual labels, together with some or all
of the PGP labels. A final option could be to use unsupervised
methods, and leave the manually labeled pairs out to use as a
test set.
From a record linkage perspective, there is an unusual aspect
of these data, and that is the potential “adversarial” behavior of
sellers. Sellers might intentionally use accounts for deceptive
purposes, for example sockpuppets or Sybils typically refer to
multiple identities created by the same person. These could
be used by scammers, who do not want their accounts to be
associated with one another. Sellers could also want anonymity
due to participation in illegal activities, thus creating different
personas. Another example of deceptive behavior is imper-
sonators who pretend to be other users, for example well-
known users with good reputations. This might help a user
to appear credible and drum up sales. Such behavior is not
typically observed in other record linkage applications, such
as matching Census records.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated the correspondence between
forensic matching and record linkage problems, and suggested
some ways in which record linkage might inform forensic
matching. We applied this thinking to a new forensic domain,
developing methodology to match seller accounts on anony-
mous marketplaces. By using a common, well-established
framework, we show how forensic matching problems can be
approached in general, in a more principled manner.
With recent public criticism about current forensic practice
and its reliance on subjective opinions of examiners, there has
been a push towards objective, automated methods. We have
begun to see increased efforts on this front, and drawing links
to established record linkage methodology could become even
more useful as new methods are developed.
As a reviewer highlighted, there are some peculiarities of
the forensic field that are worth keeping in mind in developing
new methods. First is the potential adversarial nature of
the information. We described this in Section IV with the
marketplaces data, but this could apply more broadly in other
forensic disciplines. Second is the danger of false positives and
the potential impact on human life. The consequences of false
arrests or wrongful convictions are severe, and this could have
implications on classification methods; as an example it might
be beneficial to attach a much higher cost to false positives
compared to false negatives.
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